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**From:** Wil  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 09, 2005 8:44  
**To:** Woody Bill  
**Subject:** Required USCG Presentation

Greetings Mr. Woody,

Attached is a presentation which I have submitted to the USCG. They required that as part of the settlement agreement that in order to get my license back I was to give a presentation to AMHS deck officers regarding "lessons learned from the grounding of the Le Conte". Since I am no longer an employee and have one and legal action and an arbitration of my termination coming up in the middle of February, it is highly unlikely that AMHS will allow me to give this presentation in person.

None the less I have submitted it to the USCG as Lt. Koehler the lead investigator in the grounding stated at the time of the settlement that he would "take care of AMHS".

This is short and sweet, FYI.

Best regards,

Wil Petrich

08/05/2005

USCG Required Presentation To AMHS Deck Officers  
About The LeConte Grounding  
May 10, 2004

The facts:

- The LeConte grounded on Cozian Reef at 0952 May 10, 2004.
- The weather was clear with light northerly breezes.
- Both the Captain and the Chief Mate were on the bridge at the time.
- There were no apparent mechanical problems with the vessel.
- The vessel was on a routine run on the route between Angoon and Sitka.
- There were 86 passengers and 23 crew members aboard at the time of the grounding and 7 vehicles.

The events:

1. Prior to the grounding:

Noted problems steering,

- Sleep- How much sleep had I had in the hours leading up to the grounding?
- **14 hours in a 72 hour period.**
- How was I feeling physically prior to the time of the grounding?
- **Rummy, knees were bothering me.**
- How did I feel at the time of the grounding?
- **Absolutely shocked, so unaware was I, that the vessel was standing into danger.**

2. At the time of the grounding:

- How did I respond to the event?
- **In a totally professional manner, as did every single crewmember aboard the Le Conte. The training and weekly drills definitely paid off.**

3. After the grounding occurred:

- What was the foremost thought in my mind?
  - **To immediately confer with master, assess ship condition and organize crew to safely and most effectively evacuate the passengers from the ship.**
  - What actions did I take?
  - **Organized crew at direction of the master, to continually assess vessel's condition, while starting passenger evac. Procedures. First and foremost directing mustering of passengers and preparing them for evacuation.**
  - **Established and maintained coms. With vessels rendering assistance**  
Secured watertight doors and walked out anchor to help hold vessel's position; as it became obvious that the bow thruster compartment and MSD room were compromised with free communication with the sea and were, in fact, tidal.
4. What assistance did the LeConte receive?

- **John Cobb Communications On Scene Coordinator**
- **Western Mariner**
- **Western Provider**
- **Midget**
- **Anacapa**

#### Lessons Learned:

This event could happen to any one of us and that risk exists each time we leave the dock. One must put ego aside, as statistically it is very probable that we all will have very close calls; some of which could result in major events such as this, resulting from an accumulation of a multitude of factors, or the error chain. That error chain can be induced or exacerbated by some conditions over which we have little control such as:

1. watch schedules
2. operational conditions

3. Onerous run schedules imposed by administrators who have no experience or practical background in the type of operation, IE never having sailed as pilots or mates or masters within this specialized venue.
4. ***That is ultimately up to us as licensed professionals and pilots to bring these issues to the foreground and to do everything within our power to see that we get the rest we need to safely do the job.***
5. To more rigorously adhere to the STCW conventions for operating in bridge watch conditions 3 and 4. As of this time AMHS does not have anything in place that remotely codifies these standards for their vessels.

- ***No support from employer or USCG in terms of rectifying work rest issues of which the chronic fatigue suffered by AMHS employees is resultant. They will fix blame. You fix the problem.***
- ***Self awareness of fatigue is unlikely.*** This is critical to understand. The operational routine and the scheduling are going to continue to bring fatigue as a major agent into our work environment. The reality is that it is virtually impossible to do the job and the mandatory regulatory paper work imposed, ironically enough, by ISM requirements and how they are passed on to us by AMHS management..
- ***AMHS is operating vessels on a schedule and watch structure that is virtually unchanged from the 1960's; with the result that the modern administrative and safety mandated ISM regulations are going to virtually guarantee that watch standers and non-watch standers alike are fatigued.*** There are simply not enough hours in the day to safely stand a navigation watch and attend to the administrative burdens imposed by AMHS on a 6 on 6 off watch schedule;. nor is a Master or non-watch Chief mate likely to be rested enough to be an adequate adjunct to the navigating officer when they are needed on the bridge, due to their extreme administrative burden. It is very simply math. ***Not enough hours in the day.*** As a watch stander if I had it to do again I would say to hell

with the paperwork. Let it all go, every bit of it! There is simply no way to be rested enough to do a safe job and that also.

- **Change the watch structure.** Difference between call—out and overtime actually worked. Non-watch-standing CM.
- **Change the route schedule.**
- ***Make sure at least two deck officers have at least had 8 hours uninterrupted rest in 24hours at all times.***
- **Change the corporate mind set.** The office is there to support the vessels.
- **Electronic chart display i.e.: ECDIS or TRANSAS. *At the con, where it can be fully utilized.***
- **Don't think it cannot happen to you!**
- It has happened to people at the top of their form and has little to do with professional capability.
- **Get past the “Can Do” mentality!.** Tie the boat up. It is partly from ego and partly from years of operating under such conditions and trying, albeit rather ineffectively, to compensate for these conditions that we contribute to the problem. As long as we as professionals accept the increased risk imposed by watch structure, administrative burden and schedules for the vessels that allow crew no respite, no chance of operating other than in a fatigued state it will be almost inevitable that another incident of this type, or perhaps worse will occur.

Remember that no matter what is or is not done by the USCG and AMHS to arrive at solutions to the fatigue issue; especially as it relates to the Le Conte grounding and the continued operation of vessels in this manner ; ***it is still ultimately our responsibility, as marine professionals, to make sure the vessels are safely manned and navigated.!***

***Thank you***

***Wil Petrich***